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This paper attempts to analyze the Corporate Governance Code 2002 in the light
of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) framework and its enforcement and
application in Pakistan in order to understand the dynamics of public decision-
making and assess the efficacy of the regulation policy of SECP in the arena of
corporate governance. The main objective of this paper is to study the method of
framing the Corporate Governance Code 2002 and assess its effectiveness as well
as its compatibility with international norms and guidelines. It uses RIA approach,
which is being increasingly applied in both the developed and developing countries,
in order to explain the process of assessing costs and benefits of a new or an existing
regulation. In doing this, we use two types of questionnaires. The first type of
questionnaire was used for the structured interviews with the key stakeholders for
critically reviewing the process of formulating the Code. The second type of
questionnaire was used to assess the extent and degree of implementation of the
Code on the listed companies. The analysis shows that though the listed companies
are gearing themselves up to adopt the Code, there are some constraints, and
reservations about the way it was drafted and implemented. The paper concludes
that the policy makers should try to apply RIA framework more rigorously for
ensuring greater accountability of the regulatory actions as well as improving
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About CMER
The Center for Management and Economic Research (CMER) is a research center of LUMS
based in the Department of Economics. The mission of CMER is to stimulate, coordinate, and
conduct research on major economic and management issues facing Pakistan and the region.
CMER research and dissemination roles are structured around four inter-related activities: research
output in the form of working papers; cases and research monographs; creation of data resources;
and organization of seminars and conferences. LUMS-Citigroup initiative on corporate governance
in Pakistan is a major on-going project of CMER.1. Introduction
Corporate governance is a worldwide phenomenon. It has received wide attention of
policy makers in the developed and developing countries in recent years. It assumes a more
significant dimension in a developing country like Pakistan, given the underdeveloped
nature of corporate culture and the fact that vast numbers of companies are held and
controlled by family networks. Minorities’ interests don’t find a reasonable representation
in corporate decision-making process. The behavioral patterns, i.e., the actual conduct of
corporations in terms of performance, efficiency, growth, financial structure, and treatment
of shareholders etc. are not yet well established. The laws and regulations under which
firms are operating, the functioning of the board of directors in relation to ownership
structures, the responsibility of executive dispensation in determining and deciding firm
performance, the relationships between labor policies and firm productivity, the role of
multiple shareholders, and lack of transparent and accountable corporate and financial
reporting frameworks are some of the issues confronting the corporate sector in Pakistan.
The government of Pakistan has set up Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
(SECP) in 1997 to lay down the foundation of good corporate governance by building
institutional, legal and regulatory framework for the better management of the corporate
sector entities. The SECP in pursuance of its policy of regulation has enacted and enforced
various laws and regulations in order to create an “enabling business environment” to
overcome the constraints confronted by the corporate companies for smooth and sustained
economic development. In addition to many laws in place, it adopted the Code of Corporate
governance in March 2002 in order to further strengthen the regulatory mechanism.
The method of framing this Code and its timely enforcement and application in letter
and spirit is very important for effective corporate governance. More often than not, it is
the weak implementation and enforcement of the rules rather than their formulation that
creates problems for the government. The weaknesses and imperfections of the regulatory
practices can have an important impact on capital markets, ownership and control patterns,
and productivity of firms leading to poor development of economic institutions.  The poor
compliance may reflect the fact that the regulatory instruments are not only inappropriate
for many firms but also raises questions about the general applicability of the regulatory
principles themselves and reinforces the need to analyze and examine the costs and benefits
linked with a particular regulation.  This calls for a systematic appraisal of the possible
impacts –social, economic and environmental; positive and negative – of the Code of
Corporate Governance adopted by the SECP to make listed companies comply with the
principles of corporate governance mechanisms.
A selected number of developing countries have already realized the need to improve
regulatory governance and introduced RIA in order to strengthen regulatory practices. For
instance, Mexico, South Korea and the Philippines have used this approach in the light of
the OECD guidelines for improving regulatory quality1. The evidence gathered from
Malaysia and the Philippines in a study conducted recently suggests that though the extent
and use of RIA in these counties has been partial and limited, it is increasingly being adopted
to ensure regulatory transparency2. The findings of this study suggest that the governments
of the developing countries should build the capacity of their regulatory agencies for
systematic, effective and orderly application of RIA in their regulatory framework.
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1 See Annex 1 for OECD checklist on RIA.
2 Cariño (2002) and Lee (2002)The experience of these countries underlines the need to adopt coherent regulatory
policies with strategic and systemic approaches to build regulatory tools like RIA in Pakistan.
This study explores the potential of RIA of the Corporate Governance Code and its
application in Pakistan in order to understand the dynamics and dimensions of regulatory
decision-making and analyze its impact on the corporate sector. RIA is being widely used
to describe the process of systematically assessing the benefits and costs of a new regulation
or an existing regulation. It identifies the objectives of a regulatory proposal, assesses the
risks that the proposed regulations aim to address, and identifies the options for action and
benefits of each option, including the “do nothing” option. It examines all costs including
indirect costs and paves the way for establishing criteria for monitoring and evaluation. It
is a process, which is intended to enhance the quality of regulatory governance. RIA is not
meant to be interpreted as a tool, which can replace institutional structures; rather it should
be seen as an integral part of the policy making, which seeks to enhance the quality of
decision-making process in the area of corporate governance. It is against this background
that the objectives of this study have been framed, which are as follows:
1. To study and review the Code of Corporate Governance adopted by SECP for
developing corporate governance mechanisms and the rationale behind its formulation
in the light of key characteristics of the modern regulatory systems which include
security, transparency, legitimacy, efficiency and expertise.
2. To assess the impact and effectiveness of the Code of Corporate Governance and
its compatibility with international norms and guidelines.
3. To analyze how the Code of Corporate Governance can help in the development of
overall corporate strategy by addressing significant issues like annual business plans,
cash flow projections, forecasts and long term plans in the light of the changed and
changing roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders particularly the board of
directors and minorities shareholders.
4. Suggest suitable policy recommendations for building an effective regulatory
management system in order to further strengthen and formalize corporate decision-
making process.
We present brief literature review in section two that is based on studies that were
conducted in some of the developed and developing countries. In section three, we explain
theoretical framework used for the RIA of the Corporate Governance Code. The results of
the questionnaire and the structured interviews conducted for this purpose are discussed at
length in section 4. We have made an attempt to underline limitations of the study due to
problems confronted in the collection of necessary information. The final section concludes
with the policy recommendations in the light of data.
2. Review of Literature
The RIA is one of the many policy instruments that help the policymakers to weigh
costs and benefits of an existing or proposed regulation.  These costs and benefits relate
to the businesses, economy, governmental institutions, environment and society at large.
The objective of RIA is to assess systematically the new as well existing regulations in
order to ensure that these are directed at the right sector of the economy, and have some
sense of proportionality in relations to the issue that they intend to handle.
The practice of applying RIA in the regulatory systems started in the United States.
Anderson (1998) and Morrall (2001) explain how it took a more formal shape during the
Ford administration and how was it further refined and improved in the subsequent years.
The argument behind this approach was that increased in regulation had produced a burden
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2on the economy and had contributed to inflation in mid -1960s in the US.  This regulatory
burden adversely affected the performance of small businesses in particular.
Later on, the extent and scope of RIA was widened to assess the regulation in terms of
costs and benefits that were not only confined to business but to other sectors of the economy.
The Carter administration underscored the need to adopt this approach and issued instructions
that all alternative rules should be thoroughly examined before the selection of the most
effective regulatory option.  The Reagan administration required that each RIA should
perform the cost -benefit analysis and regulatory authorities should decide about the most
cost effective intervention in the light of this analysis. The Clinton and Bush administrations
have introduced further changes in the RIA approach in order to strengthen its quality3.
Wilkinson (2002) stated that the Gothenburg European Council urged ‘mechanisms to
ensure that all major policy proposals at the European Union (EU) level include a sustainability
impact assessment (SIA) covering their potential economic, social and environmental
consequences for better regulatory policies in the EU countries.
Parker (2002) highlighted that while the economies in the developed world have gone
through a series of transformations by putting in place anti-trust laws and regulatory capacity
of the government is great in maintaining an environment of free competition in the market
place. The case of developing and transition economies is very different. There are market
failures, abuse of monopolies, underdeveloped market systems, external intervention and
qualitatively poor information.
That is why the use of RIA methodology in low and middle-income countries has not
yet achieved the size and scale compared with other developed countries. Some developing
countries have recently adopted this strategy for regulatory reform4, and a few of them
embracing this experience, belong to OECD group. Korea took this course in 1993 and
Mexico in 1996. However, Sri Lanka and Philippines are recent additions.
The central goal of the developing societies, like all other societies, has been how to
promote economic growth and sustainable development. Creating a suitable regulatory
regime to this end has been at the centre of economic planning.  The regulatory regimes
and their tools have changed with the changes in the development strategies.  The most
fundamental change during the past one and half decade has been a shift from direct
investment of the government in agriculture and industry to liberalization of economies.
The failures of state-run industries and public utilities in providing efficient and quality
service at lower costs have resulted in re-evaluation of the role of the state in economy. The
situation calls for the regulation of different sectors of the economy compatible with
international norms and trends after thoroughly identifying the costs and benefits of all
types of regulations.
It is generally agreed that privatization is the new mantra of economic development, but
the question is how governments in the transition and beyond can avoid the structural
asymmetries that special or privileged interests in the economies tend to create to benefit
themselves at the expense of rest of the society.  This question is addressed by regulatory
regimes by creating conditions for fair competition and maintaining them and preventing
the abuses and failures that we have mentioned above.
Parker and Kirkpatrick (2003) describes that the states in the developing world going
through economic transition will have to establish a linkage between privatization process
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3  See Morrall (2001) and OMB (2001)
4  See Lee (2002)that many of them are now shifting to and creating a fair competitive market.  Without
effective state regulation, fair competition will be hard to achieve.  The shift in state strategy
from heavy public sector to privatization, downsizing of governments and removing of
subsidies had left poor sections of the society without safety nets.
Jalilian et al. (2003) observed that regulation may help remove poverty by creating better
job opportunities if the conduct of the corporations is regulated keeping in view th interests
of the consumers.  Without this mechanism, monopolies causing economic inefficiencies
would emerge, putting burden on the consumers. Evidence from the experiencee of many
countries suggests that there is a correlation between good regulatory regime and better
economic performance of a country.  Some scholars have also argued that in addition to
furthering the cause of economic and social welfare, regulation is also meant to attract more
investment for the reasons of certainty and rule-bound economic atmosphere5  .
While accepting regulation as potentially effective and efficient tool of pro-poor and
pro-growth economic strategy, one however has to weigh the costs and benefits of any
regulation when it is introduced.  No regulation comes without some impact; it can be
positive in terms of helping achieve economic goals of growth, investment and strengthening
market, and it can also have negative effects in terms of raising costs for the business,
government as well as the consumers.  The RIA is about how to assess relative costs and
benefits in a systematic fashion.  OECD countries have almost institutionalized this practice.
In the developing and transition economies the RIA has not been fully embraced.  Even in
some of the countries where RIA has been introduced it has many problems. Kirkpatrick
et al (2003) have highlighted some of them: There is “implementation gap”, the quality of
RIA is very low, and more importantly the quality of data is very poor that cannot support
any meaningful analysis.  In developing and transition economies the application of RIA
remains partial (to limited sectors of the economy, industry) and unsystematic.  In the same
study, a distinction has been drawn between a good and a bad regulation. A good regulation
or regulatory system may be seen as having two aspects.  First is about the nature of legal
instruments that it has evolved or developed to achieve the policy goals that the policymakers
have set for themselves.  Second relates to the process how the legal instrument took the
shape it did and how it is applied in market place.
Radaelli (2002) found that while there is lot of variation in the nature of regulatory
regimes from country to country and region-to-region owing to how societies and economies
have evolved over time, there has now emerged a set of universal principles that may be
viewed more as a guideline than a benchmark applicable to countries.  Kirkpatrick et al.
(2003) has outlined these principles. First, development and implementation of RIA will
require skills and capacity within the government bureaucracies to objectively assess costs
and benefits.  Without these skills the optimal goals of RIA may not be realized. Second
important principle is consultation.  This would help gather information and feedback in
order to overcome legal and procedural difficulties.  Third, RIA process in order to be
effective and efficient must evolve over time preferably in stages according to the priorities.
Fourth, RIA must be adopted as one of the values of the government and must have political
support. Fifth, those evolving RIA prepare themselves to face the challenge of “regulatory
capture”.  By this Kirkpatrick et al., mean the risk of special interests inventing to get the
support of the regulatory mechanism at the expense of their competitors.  Two elements
that are built into the system of RIA—accountability and transparency may help defeat the
regulatory capture.
The above analysis shows that there is a dearth of studies that have reviewed the
regulatory policies of the developing countries in the light of RIA methodology. The present
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has been applied in Pakistan since 2002. It also examines the issue whether or not the list
companies consulted on the formulation of the Code and how they have implemented it.
3. Theoretical Framework
This section presents the theoretical framework used for the RIA of the Corporate
Governance Code. RIA is a major tool used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the regulatory policies.  It is used to assess the possible consequences of proposed and
planned future regulations, and the actual consequences of existing regulations. It is a helpful
and convenient instrument for those entrusted with the task of planning, approving and
implementing regulatory policies and systems.
The methodology developed for this study rests on two questionnaires designed to study
the underlying principles of the Corporate Governance Code, assessing its impact and
effectiveness, and its compatibility with international standards and guidelines.
The first type of questionnaire was designed to study the method of framing the Corporate
Governance Code, its application and enforcement mechanisms. The questions were framed
in the light of the format used in some OECD countries6. It takes into account the following
main areas:
1. Description: to give details about the extent, scope and scale of RIA in the formulation
of the Corporate Governance Code and describe the rationale behind its formulation.
2. Alternatives:  to show that the regulation adopted is superior and viable over other
alternatives (such as voluntary programs, market-based instruments and other types
of existing regulations) to accomplish the stated objectives.
3. Benefits and Costs: to identify the benefits and costs from the proposed regulation
and make qualitative assessments of benefits and costs, where it is impossible to
figure out quantitative analysis.
4. Consultation: to sum up the consultation among all stakeholders during the process
of regulation development, for the identification of the real problem, and making
systematic appraisal of costs and benefits in the light of the findings of this consultation
process.
5. Compliance and Enforcement: to explain the implementation strategy to achieve
compliance and apparatus at hand to enforce it.
6. Contact: to identify who can be contacted for more information.
7. Overall strategy: the overall objective and role of the decision making body.
This questionnaire was used for structured interviews and is laid out in Annex 2. Based
on this questionnaire a series of interviews were conducted with the key individuals of
regulatory commission (SECP), stock exchanges, chambers, as well as other stakeholders
directly linked with the development and regulation of the corporate sector.
The second type of questionnaire was prepared for evaluating the extent and degree of
implementation of the Code on the listed companies since its enforcement in the year 2002.
It takes into considerations OECD guidelines for undertaking RIA, as well as the key features
of the regulatory policy on corporate governance.
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   The Canadian Experience”The main characteristics highlighted in the questionnaire from the Code include composition
of the board of directors, their qualification and eligibility criteria, powers and responsibilities,
significant issues discussed in the board of directors meetings, protection of minorities
shareholders interests, corporate and financial reporting framework, auditing procedures
and frequency of reporting. Since the requirement for stakeholder consultation is a very
important dimension of the RIA programme, this aspect was also incorporated. Consultation
with all the relevant stakeholders has become very vital and is being increasingly used in
different countries as a means of producing objective data to support RIA7.
The questionnaire developed for the listed companies is attached as Annex 3. The
questionnaire was sent to around 100 listed companies of the country. However the response
to the questionnaire was not very encouraging. Despite many reminders, we were able to
get the response from only 21 listed companies in the beginning. Later on, 8 more listed
companies responded bringing the total number of listed companies responding to the
questionnaire to 29. Due to the poor response rate, the authors decided to obtain the relevant
information about the questionnaire from the annual reports of the listed companies. Since
most of the questions put in the questionnaire, were also found in the annual reports, it was
considered appropriate to expand the sample size and include the information from the
annual reports in the analysis. For this purpose, 40 annual reports of the listed companies
were evaluated in order get the necessary information8. The next section presents the analysis
in the light of the information obtained through structured interviews and responses of the
questionnaires.
4. Analysis of Questionnaires
4.1 Analysis of the Interviews
The Regulator’s View
Before the SECP framed the Code, good governance practices existed in certain sectors
of the economy; it thought some had internal capacity and could comply with the code; a
very large number of companies, family owned, were close-netted and hardly transparent.
 They would be largely the targets of the Corporate Governance Code.  But the larger
question it faced was how to bring them under the framework of the Code without creating
a scare of another regulatory regime.
The SECP had many models before itself from different countries both developed and
developing.  But it had to assess carefully the history of business operations in Pakistan,
the way companies have been structured, their ownership pattern and the existing economic
environment of the country.  It had two choices—should the implementation of the Code
be left to the companies on voluntary basis or its enforcement be mandatory across the
board.  It rather decided to strike a middle ground that can be viewed flexible and feasible.
It chose to provide a legal framework that would create an enabling environment for the
companies, which in turn, would view Code as being in their own interest.
This course of action was taken in order to remove doubts of the companies, provide
more information to the business community to assess their needs and requirements, and
engage them in a dialogue over its visions of Code in the larger corporate and business
interest. In a political environment where distrust of governments is pervasive and the state-
run bureaucracies are widely seen corrupt, inefficient and proven to use any regulation for
extortion, the Code could be seen (as it seems to have been) as a hard sell.
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8  The authors are grateful to Kashif, Ayesha, Bazgha, Ambreen and Sana, MSc Economics Students
  of the GC University for their research assistance in conducting the questionnaire.Keeping perhaps that feeling in view, the SECP avoided the temptation of making it a
part of Companies Ordinance.  That would have created such a wedge between the companies
and the SECP, and running the risk of making the entire exercise, if not futile, very costly
in terms of its economic impact.  Rather, it decided to make it part of listing requirements
for the companies.  Even this relatively softer approach has not convinced the family-owned
businesses to accept the principle of openness because for too long they have run themselves
in opaqueness.  The SECP believes that it that would require a change in the culture of
business, which is the ultimate long-term objective of the Code.
In the initial stage, (even in some quarters today), there was reluctance among the
companies to accept the Code as a legal requirement for registration. To meet this challenge,
the SECP held number of seminars and workshops in different cities of the country to
educate the business community about the benefits of Code.  Training workshops were also
held to address questions and concerns of the business community. An effort was made to
convey the true meaning and spirit of the Code and its legal requirements.  The SECP has
prepared a manual that explains the Code in detail and has distributed it widely among the
businesses9. The officials at the SECP believe that the corporate sector understands the legal
requirements of the code, and through training workshops they think they have succeeded
in removing most of the perceptual gap that existed.  Attitudes toward the Code are changing.
 The corporations and the SECP by working together have evolved a shared vision and both
of them seem to be gaining as a result of that strategy.
From SECP’s point of view, the Code evolved as a result of consultation with all the
stakeholders. It entered into a dialogue with sectoral organizations, like APTMA, professional
associations and representatives of the corporations. It placed the first draft on its websites
as well as other organizations, advertised it in the print media inviting comments on its
different aspects and provisions.  It amended the first draft after getting comments and
circulated the second draft for further input from the corporate sector. The final or third
version was formulated in the light of earlier discussions.  It issued the Code to the stock
exchanges after this extensive consultation.
Since the SECP didn’t want to put much burden on the corporations or cause unnecessary
anxiety among them, it has simplified the Code and its requirements are not too strict at
this stage.  The Code requires the directors of a company to issue a statement of its accounts
and operations that is sent to external auditors for comments.  The two statements are
examined by the SECP.  If there is a discrepancy that requires an action, the enforcement
and monitoring department of the SECP refers cases of serious violation to the stock
exchanges for an action. The purpose is not to penalize but to bring the corporations under
the legal framework of the code.
The Code comprehensively addressed all the corporate issues, but since it is a first
document of its kind in the country, it may not be the best one.  It will further evolve as
more companies come under its purview and the implementation process is enlarged.
Insisting that the corporation will have to have non-executive directors on the boards is
quite a radical change that has come about both as a result of SECP’s own brainstorming
as well as consultative process?  It may evolve further and the Code may be refined and
improved in the interest of good business practices and regulatory regime shares that
objective.
The SECP perceives that code offers one of the best strategies to regulate corporations
in public interest but that is not the only one.  This has to be supported by other initiatives.
A proposed institute of corporate governance would be such an initiative that will provide
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  and the other is the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) about the Corporate Governance Code .a regular forum for dialogue with the corporations, offer training and educational facilities
and disseminate information to the corporations.
SECP’s officials argue costs of complying with the code are being exaggerated. The
assumed costs include hiring secretary, maintaining internal audit procedures, engaging
external auditors and holding meetings of the board of directors four times a year.  They
assert that these are essential costs for a company taking public money and must be incurred
in order to be transparent.  SECP as the regulator in this respect is the custodian and defender
of public interest and in order to safeguard that, it must establish a legal regime to oversee
how the corporations operate in the market place.
The economic costs to the corporations for implementing the Code are negligible. Impact
on profitability may be there in the short run, but in the long run the benefits of observing
the Code outweigh the perceived costs.  The real issue for corporations could be credibility,
transparency and accountability.  As they improve upon these qualities that the Code
envisages to help, the corporations will see greater flow of funds, more share in the market
and better image in the public eyes and credibility with international corporations.
One cannot identify the overall benefits of the Code to the society at large.  Although
some of the operational costs occurring due to the implementation of the Code might be
transferred to the consumers, the long-term benefits to them will come in the form of
economic certainty, better stock exchange indexes, more congenial atmosphere for business
both domestic and foreign and economic development.  The SECP has very optimist outlook
about the Code and believe it is one of the must-do aspect of the ongoing economic reforms
 n the country.
The SECP considers the Code as a part of general economic reform process required
for free market economy. There is almost a universal shift in the role of governments the
world over. There is no alternative to the Code because without it the overall economic
reform process and its objective wouldn’t be realized. It was therefore essential to codify
best practices in the light of experience of other countries and implement them in Pakistan.
This is precisely what the SECP is trying to do.
The preceding analysis conducted from the regulator’s point of view clearly confirms
the need for regulation for restructuring the corporate sector and development of the capital
markets in Pakistan. This calls for the development of regulatory capacity of the government
institutions in this new situation. Has the SECP acquired that capacity?  It is a difficult
question to answer, as the Code and the SECP are both young and nascent trying to find
wider acceptance. The SECP feels the need for building its own capacity and its effectiveness
in handling regulation under the Code would very much depend on its institutional strength,
commitment of its functionaries and the skills that they acquire. It has been sending its
officials abroad to study the RIA and corporate governance that may help them equip with
the administrative and legal tools and familiarize with the best practices of similar institutions
elsewhere.
The above argument suggest that what is more important for the success of regulatory
policy is the regulator’s own learning process, its openness to criticism from all stakeholders,
flexibility, ability to address concerns of the corporations and accommodation of their views.
This learning process would strengthen both the SECP as a regulatory institution as well
as the Code.  With that focused approach, it may change the culture, the attitudes and the
mindset of the corporations from secretive to open and tightly controlled oligarchies to
progressive ones.
The Corporate View: Stock Exchange Perspective
The Code of Corporate Governance was incorporated in the listing regulations of the
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exchanges of the country. According to the information gathered, the enforcement of the
Code in the stock exchanges has improved the market discipline, risk management and the
investor’s perceptions about the outlook of the market.
The investors were generally ignorant in the absence of the reliable data on prices and
disclosure of material information. They were prone to base their decisions on inaccurate
and unpredictable estimates due to lack of standard information on share prices of the listed
companies. The Code requires proper and standard book keeping, and enjoins all listed
companies that the accounts be made public on a quarterly basis. Previously, approval of
accounts required annually, used to get delayed for two to three years due to inability of
the board of directors to meet. Now as soon as the error in accounts is detected in the stock
exchange, it is immediately made public for the information of the investors. As the result
the publication of the quarterly results by the firms, the investors are able to have better
price information leading to better investment decisions.
However, despite these encouraging and promising results, the representatives of a few
large companies, having many subsidiaries have expressed reservations about the publication
of quarterly results considering it tedious, and time consuming adversely affecting their
performance, and productivity. Secondly they were of the view that the costs involved for
the management of these accounts are very high. They call for the revision of for these audit
and account clauses particularly the quarterly unaudited financial accounts. The improvement
in the market discipline and benefits of better access to information, however, will tend to
allay the fears of these corporations, and publication of the quarter results would appear
more as a norm rather than a mere legal obligation.
The Code requires that each listed company shall circulate to SECP and stock exchange
on which its shares are listed all material information relating to the business and other
affairs of the listed company that will affect the market price of its shares. The disclosure
of material information has benefited the stock exchanges to achieve transparent trading
in share business.
Again, on the other hand, whereas some companies have followed disclosure regulation,
others company managements are still violating this vital rule by not disclosing the material
information in a proper way as required under the Code. The lack of transparency in the
announcement of the results causes serious losses to the small shareholders and big gains
for the insiders. The recent announcements made by some of the companies and the manner
in which it were made caste doubt on the credibility and capacity of both the regulators and
stock exchanges to enforce regulations in letter and spirit10.
Consultation constitutes an important element of RIA process, which not only ensures
credibility, but also equips the decision makers with better information. During the process
of the consultation, the opinion of the stock exchange was sought, but the size and scale
of participation was limited. A leading stock investor echoes similar concerns. He criticized
the process of formulation of the Code owing to restricted consultation with the companies.
He asserted that there must be some mechanism for the accountability of the regulators
themselves to ascertain whether the regulation introduced is justified and fully defines the
nature and content of the problem. The elements required under the RIA mechanism for
the consultation process were found missing. The stock exchanges were consulted by inviting
comments, which were furnished to the regulators following traditional orthodox official
style. The process lacked the spirit and substance. The result was the reservations and fears
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10 It has been found that while one company has submitted expression of interests for the cellular
license auction in the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) and disclosed all the material
information, the other vying for the bidding did not.expressed by investors and companies regarding disclosure and publication of quarterly
results and their resistance to abide these regulations, their benefits notwithstanding11.
The capacity of the regulators to ensure compliance and monitoring of the Code is
limited. It was found that there is no method or system by which to oversee its implementation,
monitoring and evaluation. Though the stock exchanges have been able to put in practice
the rules and regulations on corporate governance, there is a lot to be covered in terms of
accountability and transparency. At present, the stock exchange is not in a position to check
the degree of compliance of the Code and therefore no authentic information is available
to check its efficacy and efficiency. According to one former President of the Lahore Stock
Exchange, “ Had capacity building for the enforcement and monitoring of the Code preceded
the introduction of the reforms, the results would have been far more promising and
consequently the resistance and reservations of the companies would have been insignificant”.
Some companies’ representatives were also critical about the process of seeking relaxation
from the SECP. The Code does require that the companies can approach the SECP if they
are not in a position to carry out some of the provisions of the Code. They are of the view
that the regulators should neither have discretionary powers nor judicial powers. The judicial
functions should be sole performed by the superior courts or in a court like environment
to avoid the threat of exploitation by the regulators.
The officials working in the stock exchange are well versed with the international best
practices on corporate governance. But the investors are neither well acquainted with the
dynamics of the RIA and nor of the corporate governance. Perhaps this is one main reason
that they don’t have deep understanding of the Code nor of the RIA approach. The SECP
and stock exchanges are planning to organize the seminars for the listed companies in order
to enhance their awareness and improve their perceptions about the Corporate Governance
Code.
4.2 Analysis of the Listed Companies Questionnaire:
View from the Business: The Corporations Perspective
The responses received from the questionnaires suggest that listed companies recognize
the importance of the corporate governance for better company performance, risk management,
higher profits, good working relations between the management and owners and above all
the growth of the economy. However their perceptions about the RIA and its principles are
not very profound and extensive. It is reflected in their response in which they have
highlighted that it is either concerned with the assessment of the new regulation only whereas
the RIA takes into account the evaluation both the new as well as existing regulations. Only
two companies came up with the answer that it is concerned with the costs and benefits of
the existing as well as new regulation.
The stakeholders consulted before the promulgation of the Corporate Governance Code
mainly included regulators themselves, concerned policy makers, stock exchanges
management, auditing and accountancy firms and trade associations representing different
interests. However, the results of the questionnaire highlight that the representatives of the
listed companies were ignored in the consultation process. None of the listed companies
responded that it were included in the formulation of the Corporate Governance Code. They
were critical of the process of consultation, which is undertaken after the rules are framed
or enforced. Furthermore, they also expressed doubts that their views would be made public
or incorporated fully into any regulatory proposal.
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11 Interview with the stock investor of the Lahore Stock ExchangeThis might be attributed due to the inactive role of the company management.  The
regulators on its part did disseminate the requisite information calling for comments from
the public and listed companies. Despite repeated prodding, they did not receive encouraging
response from them. When the regulation is enforced and implemented, it is criticized on
the ground that it did not enjoy the backing of the stakeholders. This factor underlines the
need to change our corporate culture and mindset by emphasizing more on proactive
participation of the stakeholders. The sectoral organizations, which represent the interests
of these companies, should come forward and engage these companies in the process of
consultation with the collaboration of the regulators. It is incumbent on them to explain to
the listed companies the advantages of being a part of it while the costs of disassociating
the company from this process are heavy.
Table 1 critically evaluates the responses received from the 29 listed companies by
ranking the response in terms of good, bad and poor. The good response characterizes
favorable opinion of more than 50% companies, bad less than 50%, and poor less than 25%.
The main issues concerning RIA were discussed in the first nine questions and were grouped
in three main categories namely understanding of corporate governance, RIA and role of
consultation process in the framing of the Code.
As regards the adoption of the various provisions of the Code, the results are very
encouraging. This analysis is based on the information received from 69 companies.
According to the information collected, 65 out of 69 companies surveyed have included
independent directors in the companies’ board of directors. It means 94% companies have
adopted this clause of the Code in order to ensure fairness in their operations.
The share of the executive directors in 34 companies out of the total of 69 reviewed is
not more that 75%. This low proportion is due to the reason that many companies are
bringing this share to the required level while some companies have not reported the exact
information in their annual reports.
According to the Code, the directors are neither allowed to engage in stock brokerage
nor serve in more than 10 listed companies. The results of the questionnaire show that
almost all the companies are observing this rule as most of the reports and responses reveal
they are not permitted to do so, this information was not found in only two annual reports.
Eighty percent of the listed companies report that their directors are tax payers as they
have been allotted national tax numbers for paying taxes. Since the other responses in this
category were majority of the directors or few of them, the remaining companies gave their
response in these categories. Taking all this into account, it can be safely assumed that all
the directors are national taxpayers.
As stated earlier, the Code does not allow the directors to serve in more than 10 listed
companies. Forty percent of the companies analyzed have reported that this violation never
took place, whereas in 4% cases the directors who violated it were exempted by SECP
under special consideration. One company, however, has taken punitive action by suspending
its directors for violating this rule. Forty seven percent have neither responded nor described
the type of action taken against the directors.
The board of directors of the companies now meets once in every quarter as required
under the Code. The frequency of the meetings has definitely gone up as some board of
directors meet more than once in a quarter in order to discuss the problems and decide on
the issues confronting the company. The board meetings also discuss annual business plans,
budget, and audit reports etc. These policies are also discussed in the committees of the
board of directors. 38% of the companies reported that their board of directors meets on
the need basis.
The minutes of the meetings are always circulated to the board of directors and officers
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meetings. However 5% of the companies don’t circulate these minutes to the officers of the
company.
One good development that was noticed is that 58 out of 69 listed companies reported
in the sample are preparing statement of the ethics and business practices in order to establish
a standard code of conduct for the directors and employees. 6 companies expressed they
have not yet published and 5 companies are in the process of implementing this clause.
Putting it percentage terms, the figures are 84%, 8% and 7% respectively. Before the
introduction of the Code, only 35% companies were following this practice.
The adoption of the mission statement by the Board of Directors reflects the company’s
commitment to overall strategy and helps in the formulation of the significant policies on
risk management, human resource management, investments and determination of the terms
of credit and discount to customers, acquisition/ disposal of fixed assets, and procurement
of the goods and services. 97% of the companies are preparing the mission statement after
introduction of the CG code whereas 30 or 44% companies were preparing it even before
its introduction. The mission statement helps the companies to visualize their goals and
objectives. With the strategic vision the companies can improve on contemporary measures
such as cost, quality, service and speed of delivery. In addition, 96% companies are now
preparing record of policies on risk management, human resource management and
procurement.
The Code calls upon the listed companies to organize training courses for enhancing
the capacity of its staff about their duties and responsibilities. More than 93% companies
have started organizing such courses for the training of its staff, employees and management.
However the number of courses conducted are very few and insufficient. The arrangement
of small number of courses is attributable to high costs incurred for the organization of the
training courses. 75% companies reported in the sample have organized less than 5 courses
for such purpose, 14% have organized more than 5,  and only 10% have organized more
than 10.
As regards audit and accounts, the information obtained reveals that all the listed
companies are now publishing and circulating the quarterly unaudited financial statements,
along with directors’ review on the affairs of the listed company for the quarter, six monthly
and annual audited financial statements. The financial statements of the companies are
provided to the shareholders in various sources like the annual report, director’s report to
the shareholders, through mail and the newspapers.
Forty three percent of the listed companies inform their shareholders about the reasons
for not declaring dividend in the annual reports to the shareholders whereas 55% held they
do it in the annual general meetings.  The rest of the companies reported that they did not
feel the need for it as they are announcing dividend for the last many years.
The external auditors of the company are appointed for a period of one year on the
recommendation of the board of directors. All listed companies are required to change their
external auditors every five years. If for any reason this is impractical, a listed company
may at a minimum, rotate the partner in charge of its audit engagement after obtaining the
consent of the SECP. The findings of the questionnaire demonstrate that 80% of the listed
companies don’t change their external auditors after the lapse of five years. They feel that
there is no need to change the external auditors as long as their performance is satisfactory.
Moreover it is difficult for a country like Pakistan, which had four proper audit firms with
hardly 10-15 partners, to impose this regulation.
Fifty seven percent of the companies held they always value the shares of the minority
and majority shareholders equally, at the time of the divestiture of the shares, while remaining
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or have not disclosed this information in the annual reports. All the listed companies reported
in the sample, have published and circulated a statement of compliance along with the
annual report to the SECP.
65% of listed companies have responded in favor of the SECP with regard to its capacity
and ability to enforce the key provisions of the Corporate Governance Code.  They were
of the view that the enforcement of the Code should be strictly adhered to in order to promote
good corporate governance and safeguard the interests of the stakeholders. It is important
to have regulatory framework like this to have better management of the listed companies.
However, 35% companies believe that the corporate governance must not be mandatory
at least for the next three or four years. This period can be utilized for creating awareness
and enhancing the capacity of the companies’ management and staff about the Code. They
also held that the regulator must adopt a transparent and fair approach and should be
accountable to some authority not to let use regulation for favoring some and punishing
others. Moreover, the companies must also be engaged to a greater degree in the process
of consultation to enable the corporate sector to have a sense of ownership of the Code.
Table 2 summarizes the responses of the main questions by expressing it in terms of the
compliance rate. It clearly shows that the listed companies are moving forward for the
adoption of the Code despite strong reservations expressed in the first part of the questionnaire
concerned with the RIA. It calls for greater and more meaningful participation of the listed
companies in the implementation of the Code, for creating an enabling business environment
in the country.
Figure 1 presents the compliance rate of the major corporate governance issues addressed
in the Code. It shows that there is 100% compliance by the listed companies on provisions
like frequency of board meetings and statement of ethics and business practices. However,
they still need to do a lot more in the field auditing and directors independence. In addition,
regulators ability to enforce the Code also needs to be enhanced for its effective implementation.
5. Conclusions
The analysis of the interviews suggests that adoption of the Corporate Governance Code
has improved the overall corporate structure and business environment by making the
companies more responsible, and by ensuring transparency and accountability in the corporate
and financial reporting framework. The inclusion of non-executive directors on the board
is a big step forward as it will discourage the tendency of protecting personnel interests and
motives at the expense of the minority shareholders. Moreover, the addition of the non-
executive members has improved decision-making process, which was not only slow
previously, but also opaque due to the lack of interest of the board of directors to meet as
and when required.
The publication of the quarterly results and better disclosure of material information has
resulted in best price discovery of shares, which is a vital requirement for the investors
operating in the modern corporate environment. However, these findings must be viewed
with caution. It has been observed that some of the companies are still violating the laws
for disclosing the material information and are manipulating the announcements of the
results for the benefits of the insiders. This calls for the regulators to improve the enforcement
mechanisms across the board in an efficient and effective manner. The requirement for the
publication of the quarterly results must continue to be adhered to as it has improved the
overall business environment dispelling the impression that publication of quarterly results
resulted in the wastage of resources.
The analysis of the questionnaire for the listed companies shows that most of the listed
companies have started implementing the provisions of the Corporate Governance Code.
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general meetings for better decision making, enhanced transparency in the financial reporting
framework and auditing procedures, and adopted the mission statement and statement of
ethics and best practices. However, their capacity to fully comply with the Code is limited.
Though they have organized some training courses, they are still not in position to put it
into effect completely. The policy makers should look into this problem and provide them
with the means to enhance their capacity and understanding about best practices on corporate
governance. The findings of this study seem to be consistent with Qureshi and Iqbal (2003)
that the Code, though it has made the corporate managements quite conscious of their
corporate and fiduciary responsibilities has been accepted only in form and not in substance12.
It has also been found that the use of RIA has not been fully applied in the framing of
Corporate Governance Code. Whereas SECP is of the view that it followed all the necessary
steps required for the formulation of a good regulation, response of the stakeholders and
the listed companies does not corroborate this view. Nevertheless the process of consultation
undertaken during the formulation of the Code reflects that it was applied for ex ante
appraisal, but its application for monitoring or ex post evaluation purposes is weak. The
establishment of Institute of Corporate Governance recently by the SECP is a step in the
right direction. It should not only help enhance the capacity of the regulators and other
stakeholders on corporate governance but also promote RIA principles being applied in the
rest of the world for regulatory transparency.
Though the study has expanded the number of listed companies reported in the analysis
by examining their annual reports, the size and scope of this research can still be widened
as a future line of research. The information on some of the questions was not available
from the annual reports like relative shares of the minority and majority shareholders at the
time of the divesture, and percentage of the share capital offered in the stock exchanges.
Moreover, seeking more information directly from the companies’ directors and managers
can expand the analysis of the opening questions, which are concerned with the RIA process.
Apart from that, at present there is a dearth of data in the country on the effects of the Code
 of Corporate Governance. These are some of the limitations of this study. This future
research may review the Code, by look into its extent and degree of implementation in the
light of the information given in the annual reports on the one hand, and seeking more
information on the RIA features from the company management and directors by conducting
personal interviews. This will not only improve the quality and contents of information
required for the RIA, but would set the stage for the adoption of the RIA as regular feature
of the regulation policy.
There is no denying the fact that regulation matters for good corporate governance. The
experience of several developed and developing countries clearly reflect that RIA is a sine
quo non for better regulatory systems.  RIA is a major contributory factor for the establishment
of transparent and accountable systems of public policy and governance, which in turn
matter for achieving the objective of sustainable development. It is the task of the men at
the helm to introduce relevant changes in our regulatory structures to make them more
compatible with international norms and standards.   There has already been a sea change
in the regulatory apparatus of the country. The adoption of RIA methodology in letter and
spirit will further strengthen it and should go a long way toward ensuring accountability
of the regulators for their regulatory actions and subsequent consequences.
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15Table 1: Critical evaluation of the responses of the main Issues concerned with RIA
Issue  Response 
Understanding the role of Corporate Governance  Good 
Understanding of RIA  Bad 
Consultation with the listed companies  Poor 
Table 2: Compliance Rate of the Main Provision of the Code
Issue  Compliance Rate 
Inclusion of Board of Directors  94%
Share of the executive Directors  49%
Directors to be national tax payers  100%
Frequency of the Meetings of Board  100%
Circulation of the Minutes of the Meeting  100%
Statement of Ethics and Business Practices  84%
Mission Statement  97%
Orientation Courses  100%
Audit and Accounts  100%
Appointment of External Auditors  100%
Change of External Auditors  20%
Valuing of Shares at divestiture  57%
Regulators enforcement capacity  65%
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1.  Is the problem correctly defined?
2.  Is government action justified?
3.  Is regulation the best form of government action?
4.  Is there a legal basis for regulation?
5.  What is the appropriate level (or levels) of government for this action?
6.  Do the benefits of regulation justify the costs?
7.  Is the distribution of effects across society transparent?
8.  Is the regulation clear, consistent, comprehensible, and accessible to users?
9.  Have all interested parties had the opportunity to present their views?
10.  How will compliance be achieved?
Source: OECD (1995)
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Questions for the Interviews
1. Description
1. How does Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) perceive the
concept of the regulatory impact assessment (RIA)?
2. Is (RIA) undertaken before a new regulation on corporate governance adopted? If
yes, is it undertaken for all cases or some cases of corporate governance?
3. If it is undertaken for all cases or some cases, is it required by law before the
enforcement of regulation by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
(SECP)?
4. Was (RIA) undertaken before the Corporate Governance Code  adopted? If yes, how
it was undertaken? If not, is SECP considering plans to conduct a regulatory appraisal
of the existing code?
5. To what extent is the code clear, consistent, comprehensible and accessible its users?
6. What is the extent, scope and scale of RIA in SECP? What are the prospects of
expanding its coverage?
7. Are RIA documents publicly available?
II. Alternatives
1. Does Corporate Governance Code  correctly define the problem of corporate
governance in Pakistan? If so, is this the most effective and efficient means of
government intervention?
2. Was SECP fully aware of the costs of introducing the Corporate Governance Code
 on those who have to comply with them and on the general cost consequences for
the wider community?
3. What are the alternatives of Corporate Governance Code ?
III. Benefits and Costs
1. Has SECP assessed the benefits of Corporate Governance Code  which might accrue
to different segments of society?
2. Where benefits or costs are assessed are they quantified?
3. Do the benefits of Corporate Governance Code  justify the costs?
4. Is the distribution of effects across society transparent?
IV. Consultation
1. Was public consultation a part of the process of formulating Corporate Governance
Code?
2. How far the regulatory reform program on corporate governance is linked to linked
to public consultation?
3. Is consultation required by law?
4. If consultation was undertaken, what forms of public consultation were used?
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5. Have all interested parties the opportunity to present their views? What are those
interested parties?
6. At what stage in the regulatory process was consultation undertaken?
7. Prior to outline proposals being made, prior to detailed proposals being made,
8. After detailed proposals are made?
9. Are the views of participants in the consultation process made public?
10.How do the stakeholders think about the Corporate Governance Code  and its likely
impacts?
11.What is the effectiveness of the consultation process?
V. Compliance and Enforcement
1. How will compliance with the Corporate Governance Code  be monitored and
enforced?
2. How will compliance of the Corporate Governance Code  be achieved?
3. What is the degree of compliance of code of corporate governance so far?
4. What is the capacity of the regulators in enforcing the code of corporate governance?
VI. Overall Corporate Strategy
1. Is there an explicit, published policy promoting government-wide regulatory reform
or regulatory quality improvement on corporate governance?
2. Is there a dedicated body (or bodies) responsible for encouraging and monitoring
regulatory reform or regulatory quality on corporate governance?
3. Is there a specific Minister/Ministry responsible for regulatory reform on corporate
governance?
4. Are you familiar with the OECD guidelines on RIA?
5. Is your country’s approach to regulatory impact assessment modeled on the approach
recommended by the OECD?
6. What is the impact of the Corporate Governance Code  on the competition?
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Questionnaire for Listed Companies
(Tick all the relevant options applied and adopted by your company)
1. How do you perceive the concept of corporate governance?
• It improves the performance of the company ( )
• It improves country’s growth prospects.  ( )
• It aims at generating higher profits ( )
• It ensures better relations between mangers and owners. ( )
• It ensures better risk management.  ( )
2. What do you understand by the concept of regulatory impact assessment (RIA)?
• assessment of benefits and costs of a new regulation ( )
• assessment of benefits and costs of an existing regulation ( )
• Others, please specify  ( )
3. In your company’s view the rationale behind the formulation of Corporate Governance
• Code  in Pakistan is:
• Regulation of the listed companies  ( )
• Good corporate governance  ( )
• Adoption of best corporate governance practices  ( )
• Others, please specify  ( )
4. How were your company’s views incorporated in the Corporate Governance Code?
• Informal consultation  (  )
• Invitation to comment  ( )
• Public meetings            ( )
• Others, please specify ( )
5. The stakeholders who were properly consulted before the promulgation of the 
Corporate Governance Code  were:
• Representatives of the listed companies ( )
• Concemed policy maker ( )
• Concerned policy makers ( )
• Regulators  ( )
• Others, please specify ( )
6. The issues and concerns considered by the Corporate Governance Code  are:
• Ownership structures  ( )
• Minorities interests  ( )
• Reporting framework  (  )
• Market discipline  (  )
• Others  ( )
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• Before the rules are designed  ( )
• After the rules are designed ( )
• After the enforcement  ( )
• Others, please specify  ( )
8. Are the views of participants in the consultation process made public?
• Completely ( )
• To some extent  (  )
• Don’t know  (  )
• Others, please specify ( )
9. Are minority shareholders facilitated to contest election for the company’s board of
directors?
• Yes ( )
• No ( )
• Don’t know ( )
10.Does your company’s board of directors include independent directors?
• Yes ( )
• No ( )
• Don’t know ( )
   11.What is the share of executive directors in your company?
• 50% ( )
   • 75%  ( )
   • 25% ( )
   • Others, please specify.  ( )
12.Has your company taken steps against directors serving in other companies?
• Yes ( )
   • If yes how often, ( )
   • Don’t know. ( )
   • Under consideration ( )
  13.Are directors allowed to engage in stock brokerage in your company?
• Yes ( )
   • No ( )
   • Sometimes ( )
• Don’t know ( )
  14.How many directors are national tax payers in your company’s board of directors?
• All ( )
• Majority of them ( )
• Few of them ( )
• Others, please specify ( )
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• Removal from the board ( )
• Never happened ( )
• Others, please specify  ( )
16.Has your company prepared Statement of Ethics and Business Practices after the 
introduction of the Corporate Governance Code?
• Yes  ( )
• No ( )
• Under consideration ( )
18.Has your company prepared Statement of Ethics and Business Practices before the
introduction of the Corporate Governance Code ?
• Yes  ( )
• No ( )
• Sometimes ( )
• Don’t know ( )
19.Has your company prepared a mission statement after the introduction of the Corporate
Governance Code?
• Yes  ( )
• No ( )
  • Under consideration ( )
20.Has your company prepared a mission statement before the introduction of the 
Corporate Governance Code?
• Yes ( )
• No  ( )
• Sometimes ( )
• Don’t know ( )
21.Does your company prepare record of policies on risk management, human resource
management and procurement?
• Yes ( )
• No  ( )
  • Under consideration ( )
• The meetings of the board of directors of your company are held:
• Once in every quarter ( )
• Once in every six months ( )
• Once in a year ( )
• On need basis  ( )
22.Are the minutes of board of governors circulated to the directors and other officers
• Always ( )
Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Asif Saeed / CMER Working Paper No. 05-39
23• Sometimes ( )
• Quite often ( )
• Others, please specify ( )
23.How often the directors of your company file objection with the SECP?
• Sometimes ( )
• Never ( )
• Don’t know ( )
• Other, please specify ( )
24.How annual business plans, budgets and audit reports discussed?
• Circulated through mail ( )
• Discussed in the board of directors meeting ( )
• Discussed in committees ( )
• Others, please specify ( )
25.The number of training courses conducted by your company to acquaint the staff 
with their duties and responsibilities of management are:
• Less than five ( )
• More than five ( )
• More than ten ( )
• Others, please specify  ( )
26.How are shareholders about the financial statements of your company
• In annual report ( )
  • Directors report to shareholders  ( )
• Through mail ( )
• Others, please specify ( )
27.How the reasons for not for not declaring dividend or issuing bonus shares stated 
in your company? 
• In annual report  ( )
  • Directors report  ( )
• Through letters to shareholders  ( )
• Others, please specify ( )
28.What is the frequency of the financial reporting framework of your company?
• Quarterly unaudited financial statements ( )
• Half- yearly financial statements ( )
• Annual audited financial statements ( )
• Others, please specify ( )
29.What %age of share capital is offered in the stock exchange by your company?
• 10% ( )
• 20% ( )
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• others please specify ( )
30.The external auditors of your company are appointed for a period of
• One year ( )
• Two years ( )
• Three years  ( )
• Others, please specify ( )
31.How often the external auditors of your company changed
• After two years   ( )
• After five years ( )
• After ten years ( )
• Other, specify ( )
32.Are shares of minority and majority shareholders equally in your company at the 
time of divestiture?
• Sometimes ( )
• More often ( )
• Always ( )
• Others, please specify ( )
33.Has your company submitted a statement of compliance along with the annual report?
• Yes ( )
• No ( )
• Under consideration ( )
34.Has your company approached SECP for seeking any relaxation
• Yes ( )
• No ( )
• If yes, please specify  ( )
35.Has SECP effectively enforced key provisions of Corporate Governance Code ?
• Completely  ( )
  • Greatly ( )
  • To some extent ( )
• Others ( )
36.What is your suggestion to improve the enforcement mechanism
Name and Address:………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………..
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of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) framework and its enforcement and
application in Pakistan in order to understand the dynamics of public decision-
making and assess the efficacy of the regulation policy of SECP in the arena of
corporate governance. The main objective of this paper is to study the method of
framing the Corporate Governance Code 2002 and assess its effectiveness as well
as its compatibility with international norms and guidelines. It uses RIA approach,
which is being increasingly applied in both the developed and developing countries,
in order to explain the process of assessing costs and benefits of a new or an existing
regulation. In doing this, we use two types of questionnaires. The first type of
questionnaire was used for the structured interviews with the key stakeholders for
critically reviewing the process of formulating the Code. The second type of
questionnaire was used to assess the extent and degree of implementation of the
Code on the listed companies. The analysis shows that though the listed companies
are gearing themselves up to adopt the Code, there are some constraints, and
reservations about the way it was drafted and implemented. The paper concludes
that the policy makers should try to apply RIA framework more rigorously for
ensuring greater accountability of the regulatory actions as well as improving
regulatory transparency.